With regard to the issue of the personal liability of the beneficiaries on the trust deed, we must first examine the impact of the Single Commercial Code. As we said, Segaloff and Roos did not sign the note or the act of trust. And their names do not appear in any of the instruments. Subsection 8.3-401(1) of the UZK provides that « [w]here no one shall be liable in respect of an instrument unless his signature appears there. » Official Comment 1 indicates that the Code Section and the Air Power case make it clear that after the transfer to an agent, a single beneficiary no longer owns record ownership of the property and cannot encumber or transfer the property. The rights of pledge of the person`s creditors are not automatically linked to the legal title. In 1962, the General Assembly adopted Code 55-17.1, which authorizes the use of a land trust as a method of holding real estate titles. Acts of 1962, c. 452. The statute provides that Curtis and his wife then handed over the land to the Lee Land Trust and received a cash payment of 29 per cent of the purchase price. The debt of the balance was evidenced by a note of 354,649.65 $US paid to Curtises by the bank as trustee for the Lee Land Trust. *854 This rating was secured by a purchase currency trust deed, also executed by the bank as trustee for the Lee Land Trust. In court, the City of Alexandria and Nationwide relied heavily on Bottimore v. First Merchants Bank, 170 Va.
221, 196 p.E. 593 (1938). We argued that the applicable case, the facts of which were quite similar to those here, Cohn v. Central National Bank of Richmond, 191 Va. 12, 60 p.E.2d 30, (1950). The other parties claimed that bottimore contradicted Cohn or governed the case through Cohn. While Bottimore was a right, the facts of this case differed in two key aspects from Duncan`s: (1) all beneficiaries of a trust in Bottimore travelled to have that trust revoked, and (2) the trust instrument in Bottimore did not indicate any method of revoking the trust; Thus, the Bottimore court held that the trust could be revoked by all beneficiaries in court. However, in Cohn, as in Duncan`s case, a particular method has been delineated in the fiduciary instrument and so that specific method cannot be overlooked as a mere formality, the court said. In Duncan`s case, like Cohn, the trustee clearly and definitively defined a method of withdrawing ownership or revoking the trust, and so it had to be used. ELIZABETH (LILY) G.
ENGLE is a principal at the Alexandria law firm of Chamamowitz, Chamowitz & Engle, P.C. and was a partner at Dingman Labowitz, P.C. She represents individuals and companies in real estate transactions, such as. B the preparation of contracts and disputes related to these documents. Subsequently, Ms. Englefurthe establishes both entity structures for small businesses and pursues post-establishment representation, providing business-related documents and providing ongoing advice to these companies. Ms. Engle also has extensive judicial experience in both trial and appellate tribunals, including divisional and other real estate litigation, and, like Mr. Dingman, she conducts and prevents seizures. Ms. Engle received her B.A. from Swarthmore College in 1993 and her J.D.
from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1996. She is admitted as an attorney in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia and a member of the Alexandria and American Bar associations. She is co-author of « Boundary Law in Virginia », National Business Institute, 1998, and has organized seminars on divisional actions and on the conduct and prevention of seizures. English status of use was repealed in 1792 by the Virginia General Assembly, removing one of the obstacles to the validity of LandTrust. . . .