Minsk Agreement 2

Minsk-2 is not an easy document to grasp. The product of hasty elaboration, he courageously tries to make gaping differences between Ukrainian and Russian positions. As a result, it contains conflicting provisions and includes a confusing succession of measures. There is also a gaping hole: although the agreement was signed by the Russian ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, the agreement does not mention Russia – an omission that Russia has used to evade responsibility for its implementation and maintain fiction, which is a selfless arbiter. Minsk-2 followed the Minsk 1 agreement negotiated in September 2014. The talks began after Russian-backed separatists launched an offensive that could have led to the encirclement of Debaltseve, a strategic transport hub between the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. For these reasons, the suspicions of the agreements are profound, with allegations that the former KGB, who still works for the Kremlin, wrote the special status and amnesty of Minsk to provoke the patriotic pride of Ukraine and force the country to federalize or break. Negotiations loaded with loaded names only fuel such speculation; These include controversial former President Leonid Kuchma and oligarchs, who are also said to be close to Putin, such as Viktor Medvedchuk and Nestor Shufrych. The viability and credibility of the whole process is weak. But how could the conflict escalate? A victory for pro-Russian rebels in the 2019 Ukrainian elections could lead to this result, as well as a rapid growth of the far right and violent resistance in Minsk if Russia ever creates conditions in the Donbass that force Ukraine to implement the agreements. In both cases, radicals could be encouraged at both extremes, which could lead to protests or further violence outside the conflict zone, which Russian propaganda could use to continue to denigrate Ukraine as illiberal and ungovernable. In addition to the fact that it is likely that the conflict will continue to freeze. The Ukrainian president at the time, Poroshenko, did not want to make political concessions to the separatists without an appropriate ceasefire.

As a result, the Minsk 2 agreement was never fully implemented. But Poroshenko`s successor, Wolodymyr Zelenskiy, has pledged to finally implement the peace agreement. After Ukraine`s shameful withdrawal from The Donbass after the encirclement of Ilovaisk six months after the crisis, negotiators from the trilateral contact group signed a ceasefire agreement in Minsk in September 2014. The OSCE chose the capital of Belarus because it is easily accessible to all parties, at least superficially regarded as a neutral broker, and has been negotiating a new frozen conflict since 1992, rooted in the concepts of ethnic autonomy of the national minorities of the Bolshevik era: Nagorno-Karabakh. The ceasefire in Ukraine quickly collapsed when, with Russia`s help, the separatists suffered two strategic defeats at Donetsk airport and the Debaltseve railway node. As fighting broke out in Debaltsevé, emergency negotiations were held in Minsk, brokered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande.